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ABSTRACT 
Elvio Baccarini has responded generously to my book Medical Ethics: Ordinary Concepts, 
Ordinary Lives (2008), but I would like to respond to three of his criticisms: first, about the 
role that theory ought to play in, and in relation to, moral experience; second, about my 
defence of a doctor’s right to conscientiously object to performing legal abortions; and 
third, to the reality of posthumous harm. Baccarini claims that I have overstated my 
claims, and drawn illegitimate metaphysical conclusions from people’s ordinary language. 
However, I argue that moral language is special precisely because of the way it expresses an 
irreducible personal perspective. 
 
 
0. I am most grateful to Elvio Baccarini’s two detailed and generous reviews 
of my book, Medical Ethics: Ordinary Concepts and Ordinary Lives.1 I particu-
larly liked his discussion of moral disagreement and changes of seeing, which 
was more subtle than my own, and which has induced me to re-think my posi-
tion. In this article I would like to respond to three other issues where we dis-
agree more profoundly. The dominant interest of my book was what I called 
the personal perspective in ethics, and I accused mainstream Anglo-American 
moral philosophy of neglecting this perspective or trying to reduce it to the 
impersonal. The most reliable access to the personal perspective, I argued, was 
through a serious examination of the ordinary words – and especially the 
moral concepts – that the protagonists themselves would be inclined to use in 
order to make sense of their predicament, especially under conditions of moral 
conflict or adversity. While Baccarini seems to be in broad sympathy with 
that project, he believes I have gone too far in certain aspects, and to these I 
would like to respond. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The book was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2008. See E. Baccarini, On Cowley 
Medical “Etica e politica/Ethics & Politics”, XI, 2, 2009, 
(www.units.it/etica/2009_2/BACCARINI.pdf) and E. Baccarini, Medical Ethics, Ordinary 
Concepts and Ordinary Lives, “Croatian Journal of Philosophy”, Vol. IX, No. 27, 2009, pp. 
317-329. 
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1. The role of theory 
 
The first third of my book addressed the place of moral theory in any account 
of moral life and moral experience. While I certainly allowed some room for 
theory, I challenged the implicit priority that certain representative philoso-
phers – Beauchamp and Childress2 on the one hand, and Jeff McMahan3 on 
the other – assigned to theory over personal, non-theoretical articulations. 
Baccarini is more optimistic than I when it comes to finding a role for reason 
and principles, and he offers Tim Scanlon’s work4 as an example of a more so-
phisticated type of moral theory than the people whom I criticised.  
My interest in Beauchamp and Childress was based on the massive popu-
larity of their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics among medical students 
and practitioners in the English-speaking world, far beyond anything that 
Scanlon or any other philosopher has written. So although Beauchamp and 
Childress offer a primitive theory in philosophical terms, it nevertheless struck 
a chord in the professional readership that was worth taking seriously. 
McMahan I chose as a fairly successful representative (and he’s not considered 
as naïve as Baccarini and I believe) of a kind of moral philosophy that relies 
on ‘thought experiments,’ those highly schematic examples that are meant to 
test a theory against our intuitions. The most notorious thought experiment is 
the trolley problem, still apparently running strong after thirty years.5 The 
idea is that I control the points and can divert the runaway trolley down one 
track or another, and on each track are different people or groups of people 
who will be necessarily killed by the trolley. There is no third track, there is no 
way of stopping the trolley, and there is nobody else who can decide. It turns 
out that Baccarini shares McMahan’s faith in the usefulness of this approach: 
“so, different answers depend on whether the dilemma of the trolley case is de-
scribed by first saying that five innocent people will be saved and then that 
one innocent person will die, or by first saying...” (Baccarini 2010a p. X). In 
fairness, Baccarini wants to make a valid empirical point about how the pres-
entation of the information will incline the respondent to answer one way or 
another, a phenomenon known as the ‘framing problem’. 
                                                 
2 Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed., OUP 2008. 
3 The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, OUP 2003. 
4 See ‘Intention and permissibility’ in: The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supple-
ment 2000; ‘The aims and authority of moral theory’ in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
vol. 11, 1992; What We Owe to Each Other, Harvard UP 1999  
5 The original ‘trolley problem was described by Phillippa Foot, in her ‘The problem of 
abortion and the doctrine of double effect’ in: Virtues and Vices, Blackwell 1978. 
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However, I took a strong line in the book against McMahan about the use 
of thought experiments, and indeed against any theoretical conclusions he at-
tempted to draw from them or from empirical research using them. And I 
would take a similar line against Baccarini. For I claim that the examples are 
so preposterous, contrived, and often just obscene in their trivialisation of 
death, that it is impossible to answer any questions on them with any moral 
seriousness. How the hell do I know which way I would throw the points in 
such a situation? How exactly did I get into the awful situation in the first 
place? How much can I possibly know about the situation? Surely under such 
pressure decisions just ‘make themselves’, and there is no way I would have 
the arrogance to claim that I chose the ‘right’ or ‘least worst’ option. While 
there is some room for deciding who will live and who will die in certain insti-
tutional contexts, for example in the allocation of scarce life-saving drugs in a 
hospital or a national health system, these thought experiments are usually a 
lot more ambitious, and therefore all the more pointless for that. 
Now of course Baccarini is right to say that Scanlon’s theories are more so-
phisticated, and do not rely so much on thought experiments. But here it is 
important to realise that the purpose of that section of my book was not to de-
velop a new moral theory that would then have to be defended against the 
likes of Scanlon. For I am sceptical about what Scanlon is trying to do, the 
very point of theorizing in ethics, and about how well such theories can fit 
with our ordinary moral experience. For example, Baccarini asks us, following 
Scanlon, to “imagine we have the prohibition against breaking promises” 
(Baccarini 2010a p. X). I would ask: is this really a moral principle? Do we 
really need a theory to underpin it? Surely the very concept of a promise is 
something that should not be broken without good reason: the putative prin-
ciple does not do any work. The concept also includes reference to widely-
shared understandings about the relevance and strength of reasons offered as 
excuses or justifications for breaking the promise; again I am not sure how 
much Scanlon’s theorising efforts are really achieving over and above our or-
dinary understandings. Most seven-year-olds understand what a promise is, 
and understand what a good reason for breaking it is, without any need for a 
principle: “you should go to the party because you promised to go, a basta.”  
Similarly, I am less optimistic than Baccarini about the offerings of other 
theories, e.g. cognitive psychology’s attempt to “show that moral intuitions 
are frequently unreliable, even when widely supported” (Baccarini 2010a p. 
X). I am even less optimistic about evolutionary and neuro-physiological ex-
planations for moral intuitions. I have two responses to all such efforts. The 
first is to take a very strong moral intuition, for example my intuition about 
the wrongness of slavery, and to declare that I do not understand how that 
could be unreliable: unreliable in what sense? In the intuition’s failure to cor-
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respond to some theoretically-generated truth about the moral permissibility 
of slavery? In the intuition’s failure to represent some brain state or some evo-
lutionary disposition that involves the moral acceptance of slavery? I will con-
fidently declare that my intuition is utterly reliable and trumps all of these.  
My second response is to imagine myself in a situation where I am morally 
perplexed about what to do. Will the deliverances of evolutionary biology or 
brain science help me decide? If I learn that my empathy for my dying aunt is 
a naturally selected trait or an effect of a certain neuronal configuration, does 
that answer my question of whether to permit the withdrawal of her medical 
treatment? But even a moral theory won’t help here, I suggest. Maybe I 
should maximise utility or show her respect, but both actions – permitting or 
forbidding the removal of treatment – could plausibly be said to instantiate 
both. Certainly we are a long way from the theoretical force with which, say, 
the cartographer offers advice to the lost tourist; such advice is essentially im-
personal in that it is based on an expert body of knowledge and applies to any 
person who finds themselves with the same ignorance in the same situation. 
But the important thing about hard cases is that even when my intuitions 
point in incompatible directions, this fact has to be understood against easy 
cases, indeed cases that I do not even notice at all, where my intuitions are re-
liable and shared with most other members of society – and it must be so, for 
otherwise society would fall apart, as Baccarini agrees. The cognitive scien-
tist’s tone comes too close to suggesting that intuitions ought to be jettisoned 
entirely, and it is not clear what would remain after that. Baccarini himself 
(2010a p. X) favours some sort of reflective equilibrium between theory and 
intuitions, but this has never struck me as particularly revolutionary, even in 
Rawls’s original version.6 On the one hand, it is what we all do anyway in very 
ordinary cases of decision-making, so it is hardly controversial; on the other, 
reflective equilibrium still requires second-order intuitions to govern the final 
decision between theory and first-order intuitions, and these second-order in-
tuitions will be just as ‘unreliable’ in the way Baccarini fears.  
To conclude this section, let me reiterate my claim about the purpose of 
moral philosophy, a claim that puts me at odds with most Anglo-American 
moral philosophers writing at the moment. It is not to develop a theory that 
would legalistically systematise our intuitions and thereby allow us to solve 
our moral problems. Instead, moral philosophy should aim to clarify what is 
already going on in our moral experience and our moral conflicts; and one key 
element of such experience is the irreducibly personal nature of the problems 
that we sometimes face. 
 
                                                 
6 Rawls J The Theory of Justice, Harvard UP 1971. 
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2. Agamemnon and the objecting doctor 
 
To understand more of the personal nature of moral problems, let me consider 
two examples, and Baccarini’s discussions of them. (i) According to ancient 
Greek legend, Agamemnon was a general whose fleet was becalmed by an an-
gry god. The only way for the winds to resume and the fleet to avoid starva-
tion was for Agamemnon to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia to the god – 
which he proceeded to do. (ii) A clause in English law allows doctors to consci-
entiously object to authorising or performing an otherwise legal abortion, ex-
cept in cases where the woman’s life is in danger. I imagined the particular 
kinds of misgivings that an objecting doctor would feel when he found it nec-
essary to abort a foetus to save the mother’s live. 
As evidence of the irreducibility of the personal perspective, I suggested 
that neither Agamemnon nor the doctor would feel that their choice had been 
justified (that key concept for impersonal morality), even if, in one sense, each 
felt he “had to” do what he proceeded to do, and even if the spectators of ei-
ther event would see the action as justified. 
Baccarini (2010b p. X) asks about the precise relation between the personal 
requirements (to not kill his daughter, to not perform the abortion) and the 
impersonal requirements that was eventually chosen by the two protagonists: 
surely it is more plausible, he suggests, to describe both of them of them as 
weighing the reasons for and against, and going with the reasons that they 
discovered to be overriding (thereby making a justified “all-things-considered 
judgement”). Certainly the overridden reasons still linger in the form of moral 
residue (guilt feelings), says Baccarini, since wrong was done to Iphigenia and 
to the foetus; and nobody doubts the awful bad luck of being put in the situa-
tions in the first place. But in the end there was a clearly lesser evil, both pro-
tagonists chose to commit it, and neither comes to feel that they made the in-
correct choice. 
Certainly Baccarini follows the dominant line in most discussions of moral 
dilemmas. My interest, following Bernard Williams and his seminal discussion 
of ‘practical necessity’,7 was more in the experience of the protagonists, as re-
vealed by the very words that we could imagine them using afterwards. And 
Williams’s point is that Agamemnon himself would not claim that the sacrifice 
was ‘justified’, would not claim that what he did was the ‘lesser evil’, would 
not consider the reasons in favour of saving Iphegenia as ‘overridden’, and 
would not see his resulting distress as mere ‘residue’. And anybody who of-
fered these words to Agamemnon would not succeed in reassuring him, and 
                                                 
7 Williams B ‘Practical Necessity’ in: Moral Luck, CUP 1981. 
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this would not be because of any failure of Agamemnon to understand. The 
whole discourse of justification already takes you into the impersonal, which is 
appropriate for many if not most moral decisions – but not for the two deci-
sions that marked these examples. Baccarini, following Scanlon, believes that 
morality involves the “engagement to explain and justify our reasons to other 
people in a reciprocal process in terms of fair co-operation” (2010b p. X). 
Agamemnon’s difficulty in thinking of his act as ‘justified’, his reluctance to 
use the words, reveals the poverty of this kind of language for him – and 
therefore the poverty of the dichotomy Baccarini wishes to draw between the 
moral and the egotistical – when faced with the enormity of what he has just 
done. 
Baccarini then describes Agamemnon’s and the doctor’s choice as morally 
admirable precisely because it took “into consideration all the reasons and in-
terests relevant to the situation [... If, on the other hand,] the person takes 
into consideration only what is required in virtue of her personal emotions, 
personal values, close relations, or interests, we can have an egocentric, egois-
tic or prudential judgement, but not a moral one.” (Baccarini 2010b p. X) 
Here I have a very clear disagreement with Baccarini. The doctor’s values 
were personal, but they were not merely personal; that is, they were not analo-
gous to his gastronomic or musical preferences. Within his perspective, his 
moral values had nothing to do with him, but with the objective world. He 
discovered them ‘out there’, as real as the tables and chairs in the operating 
theatre. Similarly, Agamemnon’s emotional bond with his ‘close relation’ was 
not merely personal if we assume that she had anything more than instrumen-
tal significance for him; indeed, we have to assume that for the dilemma to be 
at all interesting. For parental love is normally taken as a paradigm of sacri-
fice and selflessness, and of huge moral significance. Clearly Baccarini is wor-
ried about nepotism and favouritism in institutional contexts: a loving father 
sitting on a job appointment panel can still vote against his daughter’s appli-
cation with an eye for both procedural and substantive fairness, and for the 
interests of the company that employs him. In such contexts his emotional 
bond truly is irrelevant, and it is easy to imagine the daughter herself asking 
her father to “be objective”. But that is not the situation at hand, for the im-
portant reason that the daughter will not survive a choice against her. It 
would be quite intelligible for Iphigenia to offer to sacrifice herself for the 
good of the fleet, but this would be a very different kind of situation, one that 
allowed Iphigenia’s autonomy – which Baccarini is otherwise so worried about 
– to be respected. But there can surely be no duty on Iphigenia to sacrifice her-
self, and therefore, derivatively, no duty, not even an all-things-considered 
duty, for Agamemnon to sacrifice her.  
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Moreover, Baccarini believes that one essential component of genuinely 
moral (and morally-motivated) behaviour is that a person has to be able to of-
fer “explanations and reasons and be open to others’ reasons and explanations 
[...] for anchoring the self-understanding close to reality. How can a person 
know that she is not an incurable egocentric or egoist, if she simply goes on 
with a requirement without caring whether it may be reasonably refuted by 
others?” (Baccarini 2010b p. X) 
Baccarini and I must again differ in the optimism with which we approach 
these examples. Can Agamemnon offer any “explanations and reasons” to 
Iphegenia? Of course he can offer them, but are we – in the spirit of Scanlon – 
to expect her to “reasonably” accept such explanations and reasons if they are 
good ones? Will Agamemnon really be “open” to Iphigenia’s reasons and ex-
planations, and what on earth might her reasons and explanations be for be-
ing allowed to live? It seems perverse to ask for a “reasonable refutation” in 
such a situation, as if it were a university debating club. All he is left with is 
the final look in her eyes as he pins her down on the deck of the boat and slits 
her throat. And to reiterate an earlier point, surely it would be unintelligible 
for Agamemnon to worry, having just killed his daughter, whether his actions 
were “egocentric or egoist,” since the dilemma was only created by his sense of 
responsibility for the men under his command: Agamemnon is far from being 
tempted by the isolated hedonism to which Baccarini believes my position 
commits me. 
Least I be misunderstood, mine is not a sceptical or subjectivist argument 
about the whole of morality; I am not rejecting Scanlon’s principle of reason-
able expectation entirely. On the contrary, I can accept Scanlon’s and Bac-
carini’s emphasis on reason-giving and reasonable expectation as the neces-
sary background against which Agamemnon’s dilemma derives its significance 
as a limit to discursive ethical thought. Baccarini (2010b p. X) seems to find a 
contradiction in my position when he points to my later discussion of the im-
portance of dialogical narrative understanding within a life of self-reflection. 
However, this is not a contradiction, for my point about dialogical narrative 
concerns this background, this default position prior to any encounter with a 
dilemma as a dilemma. 
 
 
3. Posthumous existence 
 
Another of Baccarini’s targets are my prima facie startling claims about post-
humous existence. The claims arose out of a discussion of the so-called Alder 
Hey scandal in the UK, wherein the Alder Hey hospital in Liverpool had been 
secretly retaining some organs of dead children after returning the bodies to 
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the families for burial or cremation. The organs were mostly retained for en-
tirely legitimate scientific research and medical education. The most palpable 
consequence of the scandal was to tighten up the legislation requiring much 
more explicit consent procedures for the retaining any tissue from a deceased 
patient of any age. During the discussions prompted by the scandal, many 
claimed that the parents had been both superstitious and selfish for objecting 
to the use of their children’s organs for medical research, because clearly, nei-
ther the children nor the parents had any particular use for them.8 
This is part of a larger debate about the donation of posthumous organs 
and bodies, but my philosophical interest in the book was focused mainly on 
the parents of dead children because of the clear and strong relationship that 
existed between them up to the death. Where my discussion became more con-
troversial was in my claim that the relationship continued even after the 
death. I imagined the parents visiting the child’s grave, and talking to ‘him’, 
despite knowing that he was dead. The only way to take this behaviour seri-
ously, I suggested, would be to claim that despite the death the child contin-
ues to exist. But importantly, he does not exist as a memory, or an image, or a 
projection precisely because one does not talk to a memory, an image or a pro-
jection – one only talks with people. Certainly the parents, within their per-
spective, do not consider him to be ‘merely’ a memory at the moment they are 
talking to him. With respect to the Alder Hey scandal, I then used this intui-
tion to address the accusation of irrationality and selfishness: the news of the 
dismemberment and organ retention was not something that was happening 
to a “body”, or to “tissue”; nor was it something being done to their memory 
of their child; instead, it was something done to their child, even if he was 
dead. 
Baccarini is not persuaded: “Cowley is too ready to attribute consistency to 
the discourse of ordinary people, and too ready to discharge them from the ac-
cusation of irrationality.” But, he says, there is nothing wrong with some irra-
tionality and indeed with some self-deception, for “these self-deceptions are 
also forms of evoking and permanently feeling the positive emotions related to 
the person we lost” (Baccarini 2010b p. X). 
The problem with the word ‘irrationality’ is that it is normally used as part 
of a reproach. Someone is being irrational normally implies that they should 
not be, they should “grit their teeth and face the truth,” they should “stop 
their emotions from clouding their perception,” they should “calm down so we 
can think this through rationally.” The implication is that parents who talk to 
gravestones or who get upset at news that their child has been buried with no 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Dewar S and Boddington P ‘Returning to the Alder Hey report and its 
reporting: addressing confusions and improving inquiries’, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 
30, 2004. See also the references in Chap. 10 of my book.  
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internal organs should “get over it” and accept that there is no more person-
hood in a human corpse than in a chicken corpse in a supermarket. The con-
cept of self-deception is also invoked normally as something that we should be 
trying to get away from, even if it might be understandable how we started to 
deceive ourselves. But even then it’s not clear that the parents are deceiving 
themselves, for they do not deny the death; as Baccarini says, they do not an-
ticipate his return among the living by buying new clothes for him. 
What I am trying to suggest is that there are different modes of existence 
in play here, different kinds of experience. It’s a complicated business, and I 
did not really do it justice in the book; all I know is that the accusations of ir-
rationality and self-deception do not help to clarify it very much. It’s not just 
that I am more inclined to take the words of the grieving parents more seri-
ously than Baccarini is; I suggest that there is something importantly reveal-
ing in the fact that most of us would not tell the grieving parents to “snap out 
of it,” would not roll our eyes and say “there they go, talking to ghosts again,” 
and would not, years later, make fun of the couple’s past self-deception and 
irrationality in the way that we could make fun of someone’s adolescent ro-
mantic self-deceptions. 
So far Baccarini and I would disagree on a metaphysical matter without 
moral consequence. But Baccarini’s tone hardens when he condemns the par-
ents for the “harmful” nature of their irrationality when other children have 
to suffer from organ failure while the useful organs are burned or rot in the 
ground (Baccarini 2010b p. X). This is part of Baccarini’s larger objection to 
the British and American “opt-in” system of posthumous organ donation, ac-
cording to which explicit consent is required for the organs to be removed 
from the newly deceased. Baccarini favours the French and Hungarian “opt-
out” policy of tacit consent,9 but it is not clear why he should be interested in 
consent at all, why he does not advocate a policy whereby all dead bodies 
automatically become the property of the state for it to quickly dismember for 
transplant and research. After all, now that the previous ‘tenant’ of the body 
is absent, why do his previous wishes matter at all? The fact that Baccarini 
stops short of this policy conclusion, the fact that the treatment of dead bod-
ies is still governed by strict moral and legal codes even when no physical 
harm could be committed, and the fact that all countries still respect the insti-
                                                 
9 Baccarini provides a statistic that “99.9%” or French organs are donated, but it is not 
quite clear what he means by this. Are there really only 0.1% of people who opt out of an 
opt-out system? Does the 99.9% include the organs of the very old or the very diseased, 
which would presumably not be suitable for transplant? Is there not a sizeable Muslim mi-
nority in France with very different attitudes to organ donation? None of the answers to 
these questions are evident from the sources he cites.  
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tution of the ‘last will and testament’ means, I suggest, that the living do not 
– and should not – always get priority over the dead. 
 
 
